Post by volkerboehme on Aug 10, 2008 12:52:03 GMT -5
Note: This refers to the Kai Tak (Hong Kong) 1963 scenery awailable at CalClassic. I merely post a clipping from an older forum thread - for illustrations download the scenery.
****************************
Hi all,
FSAviator has kindly sent me this excellent description of what it was like to fly into Kai Tak in the 1960's. This not only includes a detailed description of how to fly the visual approach to Runway 13, but also tells about how the approach was determined by political (and military) considerations (getting shot down was never far from the minds of the crew). Enjoy!
I suggest you print out the text and plate; the plate image is also included in the Charts zip file in the KT 63 package.
-----
What follows is my understanding of the detailed procedures for flying the visual approach to RWY 13 at Kai Tak; before and after installation of the offset instrument (IGS) approach. They are based on typical British crew resource management procedures and the mandatory ATC procedures disclosed by the ‘CC low approach plate’. The visual approach to 13 is shown in full. It is the only approach shown on the CC low plate. All approaches for 31 route via WL.
SC NDB is used, or rather would normally be used, during the 13 visual approach. It is not mandatory so that the approach can be flown with SC off for maintenance. Note that the top down chart invites aircrew to use the 054 relative bearing from KT when SC is off. After CC inbound they tuned either SC or KT, but were allowed to fly this approach even if both were off. Plates of this date assume an unslaved ADF card as in the default DC-3 so they give relative bearings for navaids to the beam. A modern plate would assume a slaved card and would state the magnetic bearing, but the 4D ballet would be the same either way.
I will talk you through the 13 Visual Approach assuming that you are inbound from the West any time after 1949. It is much more interesting than the IGS approach and I suspect that many of the photographs that claim to show aircraft turning from the IGS Checkerboard approach really show aircraft turning final from the Visual Approach which did not disappear just because 13 eventually had an offset instrument approach. The IGS approach calls for a 47 degree turn at about 650 QNH and the pre existing visual approach calls for a 90 degree turn at 800 QNH. I wouldn’t bet on most journalists or photographers being able to tell the difference.
As you read on bear in mind that the 4D navigation of an approach is not dictated by the gauges used to determine station passage or course keeping. The arrival of VORs would not have changed things much at all, nor would GPS if Kai Tak had survived into the GPS era.
Prior to 1935 Kai Tak was a grass R.A.F. aerodrome with aircraft taking off into wind. When Imperial Airways arrived in 1935 some surfaces were paved and some grass runways were marked. I think this probably included 13/31. This procedure probably originated as an arrival procedure for the Imperial Airways service from Penang via Hanoi in 1935. If not it may date from the Japanese Air Force extension of RWY 13 about 1943 for their arrivals from Hanoi. Arrivals from Hanoi including the pre war Air Union service from Paris via Hanoi would most likely have flown CC - SC - right base RWY 13 entirely visually and would have descended earlier over the sea, but otherwise the procedure would quite likely have been the same from the mid thirties.
When a 4D navigation procedure relates to a non precision approach it is independent of the (lack of) instrumentation used or available at a given date. The Propliner Tutorial included references to the need to use two NDBs (ORHAM + LEWIE) during IFR approaches to Auburn-Lewiston Municipal (KLEW) today. KLEW and many other airports still have approaches that may have been in use unchanged for more than 60 years. The problem is mostly getting hold of relevant procedures for airports like Kai Tak that no longer exist.
These particular RWY 13 procedures will probably have come into existence when the Communists took control of the surrounding terrain and airspace in 1949. Britain and China are about to be at war. Those cross hatched islands to the south have Chinese flak batteries. The hills inland that are cross hatched have Chinese flak batteries. Soon every other airliner arriving at Hong Kong is ferrying troops to fight the Chinese in Korea.
Any airliner that strays from the procedures is a legitimate target for the flak batteries. You can see that Britain claimed the airspace over the PRC owned islands, but that claim had no validity in international law. The international community brokered a deal that created vertical or lateral boundaries between the de facto Communist airspace and the de facto British airspace. Britain accepted the deal but the plates do not show the boundaries of the Chinese free fire zones. They extend outside the hatching.
Between the Korean and Vietnam wars things were slightly more relaxed but China was supporting various insurgent forces across SEA who were being fought by the British Army. They were being supplied and re-enforced by the same airliners that visited Kai Tak. The end of the Vietnam war made the IGS approach politically possible. The technology had been around since the 1930s. However all that the IGS approach achieved was to allow approaches to RWY 13 when the cloud base was below 850 QNH. There had never been a problem finding or landing on 13 when the cloud base was 850 or better. Visibility wasn't really an issue. In driving monsoon rain there would be other issues making diversion probable.
These approaches are all about avoiding PRC airspace and flak. That is why some of the go arounds require a MAYDAY call (* see note 1). Seeing the islands and the hills is necessary but not really the point. Being only slightly off course means a diplomatic incident at best and a fatal shoot down at worst. The problem then became the fact that aircrew were so desperate to avoid being shot down they flew into the hills.
A visual approach may make extensive use of radio aids to help aircrew to locate and identify the mandated visual reporting points (VRPs) and is an IFR approach not a VFR approach. Within British regulated airspace it had to be IFR so that it could also be flown at night. This approach is particularly complex and interesting. All IFR approaches have at least one decision point which is the missed approach point (MAP). What makes this approach interesting is that it has at least two and maybe three. The exact requirements are left to the aircraft captain. This is fairly normal for visual approaches since the concept “VRP in sight” depends as much on the ability to identify the VRP object as on the current visibility.
That’s the background to the complexity post 1949. Now look at the Area plate for Kai Tak.
From 1949 until well after the classic era all traffic from the West has to route south about around Communist airspace all of which is a free fire Air Defence Interception Zone (ADIZ). Note the arrows showing which routes are upbound and which are downbound. When Kai Tak is landing 31 inbounds must track 028 to WL else if landing 13 inbounds must track 019 to CC. Either way inbounds must maintain at least 5000 QNH until they enter the hold at WL or CC (see note 3). Only then can they descend below 5000 inside very constricted, but undisputed, British airspace.
Now look at the CC (low) plate. If aircrew went into the hold at CC at high level they still wind up at low level and eventually at 3500 QNH awaiting visual approach clearance to 13. Until 1974 there is no other approach from CC, nor from anywhere else to 13, nor is there any other type of approach to 13.
In a fast propliner you should be back to 140 knots, or in slow one 120 knots by the time you level at 3500 QNH. 175 KIAS was the max for entering the hold at 5000 QNH. You are still above cloud. The weather broadcast may be telling you that the base is 1000 over the airfield, but you have no idea what the base is over the sea or over SC. It will be ragged.
As captain you have three overriding thoughts.
1) I must avoid the PRC ADIZ to the south and to the north laterally and vertically.
2) I must get this aircraft below all cloud and into continuous visual reference with the surface as fast as legally and safely possible.
3) Once I am level below cloud I must slow down to maximise crew thinking, searching and VRP positive identification time.
You think hard about who is going to be pilot flying (PF) and who is going to be pilot not flying (PNF). You decide to be PNF and make the co-pilot PF mostly because he will be flying a non standard right base to 13 looking out of the right hand window. At key stages you will order PF to turn and force him to DECIDE. You reserve the right to override his decision. You will operate the stop watch which is going to be the most important instrument during the visual approach at any date.
Look at the top down chart at the top of the plate. American crews are allowed to fly an FAA style race track holding pattern. It is dotted. It is only an option. If an American crew take that option each side leg must be no more than 5 miles, but they cannot measure 5 miles they can only measure minutes. Navigation is 4D. You are at 140 knots so you will fly 2 minute legs followed by a one minute (rate 1) 180 degree turn at either end. Each hold takes 6 minutes.
British and most other crews will have flown a double tear drop (figure of eight) hold instead because that is the norm within the British Commonwealth for most of the classic era. They are still the norm in e.g. New Zealand.
You obtain ATC clearance to descend from 5000 to 3500 after passing CC and after entering your chosen pattern. You must descend at a minimum of 500 VSI. It will take less than 6 minutes to reach 3500. It may be a whole lot smarter to choose the shuttle hold over the racetrack.
Look down to the side view below the top down view on the plate. The British crew must use their stop watch to remain within 2.5 miles to the north and 3.5 miles to the south of CC, but they most likely also fly 1 minute either side of CC also performing a six minute hold.
Keep looking at the side view not the top down view. A British crew finally get clearance for the 13 visual approach. They do not have to wait until they are over CC to begin descent below 3500. They descend to 3000 as soon as they are inbound to CC tracking 253. An American crew flying the race track cannot descend below 3500 until CC because they are not yet tracking 253.
The British crew must not descend below 3000 until they are outbound from CC and then they must descend to 2000. They want to get down as fast as possible and they must not go more than 3.75 miles beyond CC.
Over CC both captains start the stop watch. The aircraft may accelerate beyond 140 knots in the descent so the time to the tear drop (not procedure) turn must not exceed 90 seconds. The British PF will probably choose to descend at 700 VSI for those 90 seconds; an American PF starting from 3500 might push harder. Less than 500 is illegal. After 90 seconds PNF in both aircraft calls 'turn left rate one track 043'.
PF must not descend below 2000 until he is tracking 043 towards CC. As soon as he is on course for CC he hammers down to 800 QNH. If possible before CC, but that is not mandatory. As the aircraft crosses CC still in cloud (at or descending hard to 800 QNH) PNF starts the stop watch again. Then he tunes the ADF to SC, if it is operating, else to KT. PF turns left one degree since the track from CC to SC is 042. In practice he will normally use the SC NDB for tracking to SC. It just isn't mandatory. He is allowed to use the Mk.1 eyeball if he can already see and identify SC. There is a huge difference between 'see' and 'identify'.
At this point the aircraft is already fully established right base for 13. PF is not allowed to depart from track 042 (right base) until GO AROUND is called or else LAND is called by the decider.
The aircraft is heading for the northern flak batteries now. After 120 seconds PNF is going to shout DECIDE very loudly. PF may be head down using the ADF to hold the track to SC whether or not he is in cloud. As soon as he reaches 800 QNH he starts the battle to slow the aircraft down to Vref. If he is obviously below cloud he will start to sneak head up glimpses looking for SC island. He knows PNF is about to shout DECIDE.
Now look at the top down view. After 120 seconds they are almost at the last place where they can commence a No.1 Go Around. This is the last time they can go around without calling MAYDAY for flak avoidance. PNF shouts DECIDE.
If PF can see Stone Cutter and thinks that all the cloud between him and the runway is above 800 he will call CONTINUE else he calls 'NUMBER 1 GO AROUND, METO power'. PF turns left to track 275 and climbs at Vx. PNF hits the R/T switch and tells APC he is entering the number 1 procedure. APC retain control of the aircraft. If PF calls CONTINUE then PNF tells APC 'SC in sight continuing approach'. He is then told to call TWR for landing clearance.
The aircraft tracks further along base leg still tracking 042 flying right over SC island. PNF shouts DECIDE again as they approach the shore line. PF will normally respond continue but if things have deteriorated he will call 'Number 3 go around, (WET) EMERGENCY power, MAYDAY. He turns right to track 110 and climbs at Vx. PNF calls MAYDAY to TWR and entering the number 3 go around to avoid the PRC ADIZ.
In FS9 you should proceed as follows. See note 2 for possible differences in real life.
Else if PF calls ‘continue’ PNF starts the stop watch again as the aircraft still continues on right base still tracking 042. PF is head up looking out of the right hand window for the approach lights. If and when he sees them he calls 'field in sight - LAND' whether or not he can see the runway. He may now deviate from 042 (base leg). He will now turn final and only then leave 800 QNH.
The worst possible scenarios are that a heavy rain shower crosses the lights and PF never sees them or that TWR screw up and something is on the runway preventing landing clearance from being given. That is why the stop watch is running again. If 90 seconds after SC either, TWR have not given landing clearance, or PF has still not called LAND, then PNF is decider and calls the MAYDAY and everyone proceeds accordingly. TWR could instruct an emergency number 3 go around instead of course.
The turn at 800 feet through 90 degrees to circa 132 onto final from the 042 right base potentially looks even more spectacular than the checkerboard turn through half that angle but I believe it had been happening since Kai Tak opened about 1925 and Fleet Air Arm aircraft first happened to land on the grass tracking 13 into wind on days when it was blowing from 31. Leave CC to track 042 over SC right base for 13 is likely to have been the Imperial Airways procedure from 1935, before NDBs existed and was a necessary procedure long after they were removed. 800 QNH was minimum descent altitude (MDA) regardless.
It is illegal to descend at less than 500 VSI under the IFR (unless flying a mandated ILS glideslope). Anyway you want to get down to 800 QNH as early as legally possible. Some propliners are easy to slow down after levelling, but others are not; especially if American aircrew are observing running square procedures.
Regardless of how quickly you manage to reach 800 QNH you are established on base leg all the way from CC. You will pass right over SC and intercept final at exactly the right place to depart 800 QNH. It is a mandated track, not a mandated heading. You don't want to wander about and you are not allowed to wander about. You are well below the hills from CC inbound. It's the limits of the PRC ADIZ that is not 'visible' and that you must avoid by not wandering about. Avoiding the hills is easy once you are below cloud, but is not the problem.
When an FS user bothers to do that they suddenly realise how diverse FS9 is and just how many different real world procedures, including real classic era approaches, there are available for download. Some much easier than others, but all different.
Dancing the 4D ballet is the core skill of being a pilot. Achieving full real world legal and safety compliance is independent of the radio aid in use (or absent) at a particular place or date just as it is independent of the aircraft in use. FS9 gives us all the opportunity to succeed in mastering that very highly valued real world skill. I wouldn't devote much time to it otherwise. If it were an easy skill to master or a fictional skill invented to make a good video game, it would not be worth the effort.
Knowing that you have just achieved what the real crew achieved to the same required level of skill is the payback.
Here are abbreviated propliner handling notes for the 13 Visual Approach arriving from the West that I created en route to understanding the procedure.
******************************
Transition:
CLEARANCE LIMIT = CC
ALT = 5000
TRACK = 019
REDUCE <= 175 KIAS
FLAP = UP
*********************
Holding:
On reaching CC
STOPWATCH = ZERO
TRACK = 043
DESCEND = 3500
REDUCE <= 140 KIAS
FLAP = as required
STOPWATCH = 60
TRACK = RIGHT 253
STOPWATCH = ZERO
STOPWATCH = 120
TRACK = LEFT 043
AWAIT onward clearance
REPEAT
**********************
Approach:
CLEARANCE LIMIT = RIGHT BASE RWY 13
TRACK = 253
DESCEND = 3000
On reaching CC
STOPWATCH = ZERO
DESCEND = 2000
STOPWATCH = 90
TRACK = LEFT 043
DESCEND = 800
On reaching CC
ALT => 800
TRACK = LEFT 042 RIGHT BASE RWY 13
STOPWATCH = ZERO
STOPWATCH = 120
REQUIRED = IDENTIFY Stone Cutter island
DECIDE = GO AROUND *1*
IF GO AROUND TRACK = LEFT 275
ELSE seek landing clearance
REDUCE SPEED
On reaching SC (KT 053 relative)
ALT = 800
REQUIRED = NO CLOUD AHEAD <=800
DECIDE = GO AROUND *3*
IF GO AROUND TRACK = RIGHT 110 MAYDAY
ELSE TRACK = 042 RIGHT BASE
STOPWATCH = ZERO
STOPWATCH = 90
REQUIRED 1 = LANDING CLEARANCE
REQUIRED 2 = IDENTIFY APC LIGHTS
DECIDE = GO AROUND *3*
IF GO AROUND TRACK = RIGHT 110 MAYDAY
ELSE TURN FINAL and DESCEND = LAND RWY 13
***************************************
It is the most complicated approach I have ever encountered and of course the crew have to work their way through the aircraft handling notes at the same time, but in theory these notes could be appended at the bottom or substituted for on screen use during the approach. Anyway both together is what went on in the real cockpit. In a Beech 18 PF is also PNF and must challenge himself. Multi crewing was not a requirement in this airspace at that time.
Note that there is no legal or safety requirement for the crew to ever exit cloud when attempting this approach. They can attempt this approach based on an out of date cloud base report of 900 feet over the airfield when the current base is 600 feet across the entire region, but they must then terminate the approach in time to fly the non emergency number 1 go around since the requirement to identify SC visually is not met and they must abort the approach as soon as the first visual requirement is not met. They can use as many radio aids as they like to help them meet the visual identification requirement must not continue to use them if they fail to identify a VRP in time.
Note 1.
To fly an emergency procedure aircrew must declare an emergency. There are two grades of emergency MAYDAY and the lesser PAN. I do not know for sure whether the status of the number 3 go-around was MAYDAY or PAN and it may have varied in and outside times of war.
Note 2.
The chart rather implies that the approach lights to 13 may have been mounted on poles of sufficient height that they were visible from 800 QNH over Stone Cutter and that it was forbidden to proceed beyond SC if the lights were not visible from 800 over SC. Whether this works in FS9 depends on odd things like the autogen density setting and building density users have chosen. Hence the need for the third decision point at the end of a timed leg commenced over SC when practicing this procedure in FS9.
Note 3.
In this commentary I have made no mention of the complexity that arises from the need to separate traffic departing 31 eastbound against the westbound arrivals to 13. In passing note that in most cases there would be outbound traffic downbound from WL at 5000 and that no descent below 6000 would have been available before CC.
FSAviator 5/06
****************************
Hi all,
FSAviator has kindly sent me this excellent description of what it was like to fly into Kai Tak in the 1960's. This not only includes a detailed description of how to fly the visual approach to Runway 13, but also tells about how the approach was determined by political (and military) considerations (getting shot down was never far from the minds of the crew). Enjoy!
I suggest you print out the text and plate; the plate image is also included in the Charts zip file in the KT 63 package.
-----
What follows is my understanding of the detailed procedures for flying the visual approach to RWY 13 at Kai Tak; before and after installation of the offset instrument (IGS) approach. They are based on typical British crew resource management procedures and the mandatory ATC procedures disclosed by the ‘CC low approach plate’. The visual approach to 13 is shown in full. It is the only approach shown on the CC low plate. All approaches for 31 route via WL.
SC NDB is used, or rather would normally be used, during the 13 visual approach. It is not mandatory so that the approach can be flown with SC off for maintenance. Note that the top down chart invites aircrew to use the 054 relative bearing from KT when SC is off. After CC inbound they tuned either SC or KT, but were allowed to fly this approach even if both were off. Plates of this date assume an unslaved ADF card as in the default DC-3 so they give relative bearings for navaids to the beam. A modern plate would assume a slaved card and would state the magnetic bearing, but the 4D ballet would be the same either way.
I will talk you through the 13 Visual Approach assuming that you are inbound from the West any time after 1949. It is much more interesting than the IGS approach and I suspect that many of the photographs that claim to show aircraft turning from the IGS Checkerboard approach really show aircraft turning final from the Visual Approach which did not disappear just because 13 eventually had an offset instrument approach. The IGS approach calls for a 47 degree turn at about 650 QNH and the pre existing visual approach calls for a 90 degree turn at 800 QNH. I wouldn’t bet on most journalists or photographers being able to tell the difference.
As you read on bear in mind that the 4D navigation of an approach is not dictated by the gauges used to determine station passage or course keeping. The arrival of VORs would not have changed things much at all, nor would GPS if Kai Tak had survived into the GPS era.
Prior to 1935 Kai Tak was a grass R.A.F. aerodrome with aircraft taking off into wind. When Imperial Airways arrived in 1935 some surfaces were paved and some grass runways were marked. I think this probably included 13/31. This procedure probably originated as an arrival procedure for the Imperial Airways service from Penang via Hanoi in 1935. If not it may date from the Japanese Air Force extension of RWY 13 about 1943 for their arrivals from Hanoi. Arrivals from Hanoi including the pre war Air Union service from Paris via Hanoi would most likely have flown CC - SC - right base RWY 13 entirely visually and would have descended earlier over the sea, but otherwise the procedure would quite likely have been the same from the mid thirties.
When a 4D navigation procedure relates to a non precision approach it is independent of the (lack of) instrumentation used or available at a given date. The Propliner Tutorial included references to the need to use two NDBs (ORHAM + LEWIE) during IFR approaches to Auburn-Lewiston Municipal (KLEW) today. KLEW and many other airports still have approaches that may have been in use unchanged for more than 60 years. The problem is mostly getting hold of relevant procedures for airports like Kai Tak that no longer exist.
These particular RWY 13 procedures will probably have come into existence when the Communists took control of the surrounding terrain and airspace in 1949. Britain and China are about to be at war. Those cross hatched islands to the south have Chinese flak batteries. The hills inland that are cross hatched have Chinese flak batteries. Soon every other airliner arriving at Hong Kong is ferrying troops to fight the Chinese in Korea.
Any airliner that strays from the procedures is a legitimate target for the flak batteries. You can see that Britain claimed the airspace over the PRC owned islands, but that claim had no validity in international law. The international community brokered a deal that created vertical or lateral boundaries between the de facto Communist airspace and the de facto British airspace. Britain accepted the deal but the plates do not show the boundaries of the Chinese free fire zones. They extend outside the hatching.
Between the Korean and Vietnam wars things were slightly more relaxed but China was supporting various insurgent forces across SEA who were being fought by the British Army. They were being supplied and re-enforced by the same airliners that visited Kai Tak. The end of the Vietnam war made the IGS approach politically possible. The technology had been around since the 1930s. However all that the IGS approach achieved was to allow approaches to RWY 13 when the cloud base was below 850 QNH. There had never been a problem finding or landing on 13 when the cloud base was 850 or better. Visibility wasn't really an issue. In driving monsoon rain there would be other issues making diversion probable.
These approaches are all about avoiding PRC airspace and flak. That is why some of the go arounds require a MAYDAY call (* see note 1). Seeing the islands and the hills is necessary but not really the point. Being only slightly off course means a diplomatic incident at best and a fatal shoot down at worst. The problem then became the fact that aircrew were so desperate to avoid being shot down they flew into the hills.
A visual approach may make extensive use of radio aids to help aircrew to locate and identify the mandated visual reporting points (VRPs) and is an IFR approach not a VFR approach. Within British regulated airspace it had to be IFR so that it could also be flown at night. This approach is particularly complex and interesting. All IFR approaches have at least one decision point which is the missed approach point (MAP). What makes this approach interesting is that it has at least two and maybe three. The exact requirements are left to the aircraft captain. This is fairly normal for visual approaches since the concept “VRP in sight” depends as much on the ability to identify the VRP object as on the current visibility.
That’s the background to the complexity post 1949. Now look at the Area plate for Kai Tak.
From 1949 until well after the classic era all traffic from the West has to route south about around Communist airspace all of which is a free fire Air Defence Interception Zone (ADIZ). Note the arrows showing which routes are upbound and which are downbound. When Kai Tak is landing 31 inbounds must track 028 to WL else if landing 13 inbounds must track 019 to CC. Either way inbounds must maintain at least 5000 QNH until they enter the hold at WL or CC (see note 3). Only then can they descend below 5000 inside very constricted, but undisputed, British airspace.
Now look at the CC (low) plate. If aircrew went into the hold at CC at high level they still wind up at low level and eventually at 3500 QNH awaiting visual approach clearance to 13. Until 1974 there is no other approach from CC, nor from anywhere else to 13, nor is there any other type of approach to 13.
In a fast propliner you should be back to 140 knots, or in slow one 120 knots by the time you level at 3500 QNH. 175 KIAS was the max for entering the hold at 5000 QNH. You are still above cloud. The weather broadcast may be telling you that the base is 1000 over the airfield, but you have no idea what the base is over the sea or over SC. It will be ragged.
As captain you have three overriding thoughts.
1) I must avoid the PRC ADIZ to the south and to the north laterally and vertically.
2) I must get this aircraft below all cloud and into continuous visual reference with the surface as fast as legally and safely possible.
3) Once I am level below cloud I must slow down to maximise crew thinking, searching and VRP positive identification time.
You think hard about who is going to be pilot flying (PF) and who is going to be pilot not flying (PNF). You decide to be PNF and make the co-pilot PF mostly because he will be flying a non standard right base to 13 looking out of the right hand window. At key stages you will order PF to turn and force him to DECIDE. You reserve the right to override his decision. You will operate the stop watch which is going to be the most important instrument during the visual approach at any date.
Look at the top down chart at the top of the plate. American crews are allowed to fly an FAA style race track holding pattern. It is dotted. It is only an option. If an American crew take that option each side leg must be no more than 5 miles, but they cannot measure 5 miles they can only measure minutes. Navigation is 4D. You are at 140 knots so you will fly 2 minute legs followed by a one minute (rate 1) 180 degree turn at either end. Each hold takes 6 minutes.
British and most other crews will have flown a double tear drop (figure of eight) hold instead because that is the norm within the British Commonwealth for most of the classic era. They are still the norm in e.g. New Zealand.
You obtain ATC clearance to descend from 5000 to 3500 after passing CC and after entering your chosen pattern. You must descend at a minimum of 500 VSI. It will take less than 6 minutes to reach 3500. It may be a whole lot smarter to choose the shuttle hold over the racetrack.
Look down to the side view below the top down view on the plate. The British crew must use their stop watch to remain within 2.5 miles to the north and 3.5 miles to the south of CC, but they most likely also fly 1 minute either side of CC also performing a six minute hold.
Keep looking at the side view not the top down view. A British crew finally get clearance for the 13 visual approach. They do not have to wait until they are over CC to begin descent below 3500. They descend to 3000 as soon as they are inbound to CC tracking 253. An American crew flying the race track cannot descend below 3500 until CC because they are not yet tracking 253.
The British crew must not descend below 3000 until they are outbound from CC and then they must descend to 2000. They want to get down as fast as possible and they must not go more than 3.75 miles beyond CC.
Over CC both captains start the stop watch. The aircraft may accelerate beyond 140 knots in the descent so the time to the tear drop (not procedure) turn must not exceed 90 seconds. The British PF will probably choose to descend at 700 VSI for those 90 seconds; an American PF starting from 3500 might push harder. Less than 500 is illegal. After 90 seconds PNF in both aircraft calls 'turn left rate one track 043'.
PF must not descend below 2000 until he is tracking 043 towards CC. As soon as he is on course for CC he hammers down to 800 QNH. If possible before CC, but that is not mandatory. As the aircraft crosses CC still in cloud (at or descending hard to 800 QNH) PNF starts the stop watch again. Then he tunes the ADF to SC, if it is operating, else to KT. PF turns left one degree since the track from CC to SC is 042. In practice he will normally use the SC NDB for tracking to SC. It just isn't mandatory. He is allowed to use the Mk.1 eyeball if he can already see and identify SC. There is a huge difference between 'see' and 'identify'.
At this point the aircraft is already fully established right base for 13. PF is not allowed to depart from track 042 (right base) until GO AROUND is called or else LAND is called by the decider.
The aircraft is heading for the northern flak batteries now. After 120 seconds PNF is going to shout DECIDE very loudly. PF may be head down using the ADF to hold the track to SC whether or not he is in cloud. As soon as he reaches 800 QNH he starts the battle to slow the aircraft down to Vref. If he is obviously below cloud he will start to sneak head up glimpses looking for SC island. He knows PNF is about to shout DECIDE.
Now look at the top down view. After 120 seconds they are almost at the last place where they can commence a No.1 Go Around. This is the last time they can go around without calling MAYDAY for flak avoidance. PNF shouts DECIDE.
If PF can see Stone Cutter and thinks that all the cloud between him and the runway is above 800 he will call CONTINUE else he calls 'NUMBER 1 GO AROUND, METO power'. PF turns left to track 275 and climbs at Vx. PNF hits the R/T switch and tells APC he is entering the number 1 procedure. APC retain control of the aircraft. If PF calls CONTINUE then PNF tells APC 'SC in sight continuing approach'. He is then told to call TWR for landing clearance.
The aircraft tracks further along base leg still tracking 042 flying right over SC island. PNF shouts DECIDE again as they approach the shore line. PF will normally respond continue but if things have deteriorated he will call 'Number 3 go around, (WET) EMERGENCY power, MAYDAY. He turns right to track 110 and climbs at Vx. PNF calls MAYDAY to TWR and entering the number 3 go around to avoid the PRC ADIZ.
In FS9 you should proceed as follows. See note 2 for possible differences in real life.
Else if PF calls ‘continue’ PNF starts the stop watch again as the aircraft still continues on right base still tracking 042. PF is head up looking out of the right hand window for the approach lights. If and when he sees them he calls 'field in sight - LAND' whether or not he can see the runway. He may now deviate from 042 (base leg). He will now turn final and only then leave 800 QNH.
The worst possible scenarios are that a heavy rain shower crosses the lights and PF never sees them or that TWR screw up and something is on the runway preventing landing clearance from being given. That is why the stop watch is running again. If 90 seconds after SC either, TWR have not given landing clearance, or PF has still not called LAND, then PNF is decider and calls the MAYDAY and everyone proceeds accordingly. TWR could instruct an emergency number 3 go around instead of course.
The turn at 800 feet through 90 degrees to circa 132 onto final from the 042 right base potentially looks even more spectacular than the checkerboard turn through half that angle but I believe it had been happening since Kai Tak opened about 1925 and Fleet Air Arm aircraft first happened to land on the grass tracking 13 into wind on days when it was blowing from 31. Leave CC to track 042 over SC right base for 13 is likely to have been the Imperial Airways procedure from 1935, before NDBs existed and was a necessary procedure long after they were removed. 800 QNH was minimum descent altitude (MDA) regardless.
It is illegal to descend at less than 500 VSI under the IFR (unless flying a mandated ILS glideslope). Anyway you want to get down to 800 QNH as early as legally possible. Some propliners are easy to slow down after levelling, but others are not; especially if American aircrew are observing running square procedures.
Regardless of how quickly you manage to reach 800 QNH you are established on base leg all the way from CC. You will pass right over SC and intercept final at exactly the right place to depart 800 QNH. It is a mandated track, not a mandated heading. You don't want to wander about and you are not allowed to wander about. You are well below the hills from CC inbound. It's the limits of the PRC ADIZ that is not 'visible' and that you must avoid by not wandering about. Avoiding the hills is easy once you are below cloud, but is not the problem.
When an FS user bothers to do that they suddenly realise how diverse FS9 is and just how many different real world procedures, including real classic era approaches, there are available for download. Some much easier than others, but all different.
Dancing the 4D ballet is the core skill of being a pilot. Achieving full real world legal and safety compliance is independent of the radio aid in use (or absent) at a particular place or date just as it is independent of the aircraft in use. FS9 gives us all the opportunity to succeed in mastering that very highly valued real world skill. I wouldn't devote much time to it otherwise. If it were an easy skill to master or a fictional skill invented to make a good video game, it would not be worth the effort.
Knowing that you have just achieved what the real crew achieved to the same required level of skill is the payback.
Here are abbreviated propliner handling notes for the 13 Visual Approach arriving from the West that I created en route to understanding the procedure.
******************************
Transition:
CLEARANCE LIMIT = CC
ALT = 5000
TRACK = 019
REDUCE <= 175 KIAS
FLAP = UP
*********************
Holding:
On reaching CC
STOPWATCH = ZERO
TRACK = 043
DESCEND = 3500
REDUCE <= 140 KIAS
FLAP = as required
STOPWATCH = 60
TRACK = RIGHT 253
STOPWATCH = ZERO
STOPWATCH = 120
TRACK = LEFT 043
AWAIT onward clearance
REPEAT
**********************
Approach:
CLEARANCE LIMIT = RIGHT BASE RWY 13
TRACK = 253
DESCEND = 3000
On reaching CC
STOPWATCH = ZERO
DESCEND = 2000
STOPWATCH = 90
TRACK = LEFT 043
DESCEND = 800
On reaching CC
ALT => 800
TRACK = LEFT 042 RIGHT BASE RWY 13
STOPWATCH = ZERO
STOPWATCH = 120
REQUIRED = IDENTIFY Stone Cutter island
DECIDE = GO AROUND *1*
IF GO AROUND TRACK = LEFT 275
ELSE seek landing clearance
REDUCE SPEED
On reaching SC (KT 053 relative)
ALT = 800
REQUIRED = NO CLOUD AHEAD <=800
DECIDE = GO AROUND *3*
IF GO AROUND TRACK = RIGHT 110 MAYDAY
ELSE TRACK = 042 RIGHT BASE
STOPWATCH = ZERO
STOPWATCH = 90
REQUIRED 1 = LANDING CLEARANCE
REQUIRED 2 = IDENTIFY APC LIGHTS
DECIDE = GO AROUND *3*
IF GO AROUND TRACK = RIGHT 110 MAYDAY
ELSE TURN FINAL and DESCEND = LAND RWY 13
***************************************
It is the most complicated approach I have ever encountered and of course the crew have to work their way through the aircraft handling notes at the same time, but in theory these notes could be appended at the bottom or substituted for on screen use during the approach. Anyway both together is what went on in the real cockpit. In a Beech 18 PF is also PNF and must challenge himself. Multi crewing was not a requirement in this airspace at that time.
Note that there is no legal or safety requirement for the crew to ever exit cloud when attempting this approach. They can attempt this approach based on an out of date cloud base report of 900 feet over the airfield when the current base is 600 feet across the entire region, but they must then terminate the approach in time to fly the non emergency number 1 go around since the requirement to identify SC visually is not met and they must abort the approach as soon as the first visual requirement is not met. They can use as many radio aids as they like to help them meet the visual identification requirement must not continue to use them if they fail to identify a VRP in time.
Note 1.
To fly an emergency procedure aircrew must declare an emergency. There are two grades of emergency MAYDAY and the lesser PAN. I do not know for sure whether the status of the number 3 go-around was MAYDAY or PAN and it may have varied in and outside times of war.
Note 2.
The chart rather implies that the approach lights to 13 may have been mounted on poles of sufficient height that they were visible from 800 QNH over Stone Cutter and that it was forbidden to proceed beyond SC if the lights were not visible from 800 over SC. Whether this works in FS9 depends on odd things like the autogen density setting and building density users have chosen. Hence the need for the third decision point at the end of a timed leg commenced over SC when practicing this procedure in FS9.
Note 3.
In this commentary I have made no mention of the complexity that arises from the need to separate traffic departing 31 eastbound against the westbound arrivals to 13. In passing note that in most cases there would be outbound traffic downbound from WL at 5000 and that no descent below 6000 would have been available before CC.
FSAviator 5/06